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EVIDENCE: WHETHIE THE SPoNTANEous DECLARATION OF AN AGENT MAY
BE USED TO PRoVE THE AGENCY
It was one and one-half hours after his regular work day when James
Murphy struck and injured Thomas Ball, a minor, with his automobile. Ball
brought a personal injury action against Murphy and his employer, through
his next friend and mother. The child's mother testified that immediately after
the injury and at the scene of the accident, Murphy "told me that he was
sorry, that he hoped my son wasn't seriously hurt, he had to call on a customer
and was in a bit of a hurry."
At the trial a prima facie case of negligence was established against Murphy.
But it was soon apparent that the statement by driver Murphy during the
heat of the occasion would be crucial in attaching liability to his employer.
It was admitted that Murphy was employed as a clerk in his stepfather's
business concern. But both Murphy and his employer insisted his duties were
inside clerical work and denied he was authorized to use his personal car on
company business. The record shows that some months after the accident
Murphy made calls on customers using his own car. He flatly denied making
any statement whatsoever immediately after the accident.
With these facts before it a federal district court in Murphy Auto Parts Co. v.
Ball' rendered judgment for the plaintiff. The judgment was challenged on
appeal and the Court of Appeals held that the alleged out-of-court utterance
by driver Murphy was admissible to show that Murphy had in fact been en-
gaged in his employer's business at the time of the collision with the plaintiff
pedestrian. The statement was admitted in evidence because the court con-
cluded it qualified as a spontaneous declaration or excited utterance.
There has been occasional confusion in the courts as to what theory was
being employed to admit or exclude the extrajudicial declaration of an agent.
This uncertainty has resulted from the failure in some courts to draw a clear
distinction between the vicarious admissions doctrine and the spontaneous dec-
larations doctrine-two unrelated exceptions to the hearsay rule of evidence.
Though the Murphy case unmistakably distinguishes the two doctrines, the con-
fusion has been especially evidenced in like cases involving tortious liability
where the declarant was an agent and the utterance was prompted by some
exciting occurrence. One reason for the uncertainty is the indiscriminate use
of the term res gestae to describe and qualify both situations.2
According to the majority rule a spontaneous declaration is a statement made
immediately after an exciting event by a participant or spectator asserting the
circumstances of the event as they were observed by him.3 If the statement is
made under the stress of the event anything said concerning the event is ad-
missible in evidence. Such a rule is applicable whether or not the declarant is
an agent, the theory behind the rule being wholly independent of agency prin-
ciples for support. If the utterer also happens to be an agent his declaration
is introduced testimonially, not to show authority but as bearing upon the facts
1249 F.2d 508 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
2 Coryell v. Clifford F. Reid, Inc., 117 Cal. App. 534, 537, 4 P.2d 295, 296 (1931) (con-
curring opinion).
8 Keefe v. State, 50 Ariz. 293, 297-98, 72 P.2d 425, 427 (1937) ; WIGmo E, EVIDENCE § 1745,
1747 (3d ed. 1940); MoDEL CODE OF EVIEmc rule 512 (1942).
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of the event in question.4 However, it must be emphasized that while the
agent's declaration, though unauthorized, may be admissible as a spontaneous
declaration to establish the agent's liability (i.e., the agent's negligence), it is
almost universally inadmissible to prove the fact of agency because it simply
fails under such circumstances to bear upon the facts of the exciting event and
so does not qualify as a spontaneous declaration.
To be distinguished is the situation in which the utterer is an agent but no
exciting event has prompted his statement. Here the statement cannot qualify
as a spontaneous declaration but may qualify as a vicarious admission. Nor-
mally, an agent's declaration concerning his authority is inadmissible against
his employer because it is hearsay.5 But under the vicarious admissions doctrine,
based upon agency principles, the employer is charged with liability for the
agent's admissions made in the course of employment.6 It is as if the agent's
statements were made by the employer himself. Such a rule does not permit
the alleged agent's declarations to be received as admissions until the fact of
agency is first admitted or shown by independent evidence.7 Thus, if it can be
proved that the agent's statements were authorized, admissions made by him in
the scope of employment may be introduced testimonially against the employer.
That there are two distinct principles which invariably become confused is
pointed out by Justice Cothran in his dissenting opinions in Snipes v. Augusta-
Aiken Ry. & Electric Corporation8 and Chantry v. Pettit Motor Co.9 After draw-
ing a distinction between "the declarations of an agent which are a part of the
res gestae," (i.e., spontaneous declarations) and "declarations which were made
in the course of employment and while the matter in controversy was pending"
(i.e., vicarious admissions), Justice Cothran states: 10
[It is misleading and incorrect, manifestly, to hold that, before the declarations
of an agent can be received, they must be shown to have been both a part of the
res gestae and within the course of employment. They may be either or both, and
admissible for that reason.
In California, the general view that the declarations of an agent are not
admissible to prove the fact of agency or the extent of his power as an agent
without independent evidence of the agency, is clearly established.'1 This view
is in accordance with the principle underlying application of the vicarious
admissions doctrine. Nevertheless, uncertainty as to the theoretical basis for
admissibility of an agent's extrajudicial statements is also apparent in California
decisions, though the majority opinion written by Justice Carter in Lane v.
4 MECnEm, AGENCY § 1793 (2d ed. 1914); WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 1078 (3d ed. 1940).
5 MECaEm, AGENCY § 95 (4th ed. 1952); RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 285 (1933); 3 A.L.R.
2d 598 (1949).
6 Franklin Bank v. Pennsylvania D. & M.S.N. Co., 24 Md. (11 G. & J.) 28, 33 (1839);
CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1870, ff 5; WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1078 (3d ed. 1940); MODEL CODE
OF EVIDENCE rule 508 (1942).
7MECnEm, AGENCY § 1774 (2d ed. 1914); WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 1078 (3d ed. 1940);
RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 286 (1933).
8 151 S.C. 391, 403-04, 149 S.E. 111, 115 (1929) (dissent).
9 156 S.C. 1, 14, 152 S.E. 753, 757 (1930) (dissent).
10 Lane v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 26 Cal.2d 575, 582, 160 P.2d 21, 24 (1945), quoting
from WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1756 a (3d ed. 1940), quoting from Snipes v. Augusta-Aiken Ry.
& Electric Corporation, 151 S.C. at 403-04, 149 S.E. at 111.
11 Swinnerton v. Argonaut Land and Development Co., 112 Cal. 375, 44 Pac. 719 (1896).
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Pacific Greykound Lines" has done much to dispel this confusion. Quoting
from Justice Cothran's dissent in the Snipes case, and holding that the spon-
taneous declaration of an agent need not have been made in the scope of the
agent's employment, the California court concludes the existence of the em-
ployer-employee relationship is immaterial where the utterance is admissible
under the spontaneous declaration exception.
Manifestly to keep the two principles in different camps is to free the
agent's spontaneous declaration from the requirements imposed by the vicarious
admissions rule and allow his declaration the same respect in regard to admissi-
bility as would be allowed a person not an agent.13
To obtain an adequate understanding of the spontaneous declaration doctrine
as a separate and distinct exception to the hearsay rule of evidence an explana-
tion of this rule is necessary. McCormick defines hearsay evidence as "testimony
in court or written evidence of a statement made out of court, such statement
being offered as an assertion to show the truth of the matters asserted therein,
and thus resting for its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court asserter."'' 4
It should be noted that the reason for the rule is not to prevent a witness in
court from telling a falsehood. The witness is already under oath and subject
to prosecution for perjury. Rather, the reason for the rule is to compensate
for the impossible task of checking the accuracy and truth of the one who
made the statement. The rule excludes only such statements as are being offered
to assert the truth of the assertions testimonially. Its purpose is to exclude
testimony not likely to be very reliable or trustworthy since there is no oppor-
tunity to cross-examine when the statement was made.
The main purpose for exclusion of hearsay testimony is negated where the
probability of substantial reliability and trustworthiness appears in the circum-
stances surrounding the utterance. Thus the spontaneous declaration arises as
an exception to the hearsay rule, for under the stress of nervous excitement the
reflective processes of the utterer may be stilled sufficiently for him to express
his real belief or impressions. 15 In short, under certain circumstances of external
shock, the utterance may be taken as trustworthy since the utterer had no
time to reflect or contrive. However, the principle is not absolute, and herein
lies the difficulty in applying it to a particular fact situation.
Wigmore lists three practical limitations of the principle allowing the ad-
missibility of the spontaneous declaration: (a) There must be a startling occasion
to produce the nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and
unreflecting; (b) the utterance must have been before there has been time to
contrive or misrepresent, though it need not be strictly contemporaneous; and
(c) the utterance must relate to the circumstances of the occurrence preceding
it.16
Most litigation in decided cases is in regard to the proper application of
limitation (b), but it is in regard to limitation (c) that this note must primarily
concern itself. Though limitation (c) is cautionary rather than a logically neces-
12 26 Cal.2d 575, 160 P.2d 21. See White v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., 73 Cal. App. 2d 720,
167 P.2d 530 (1946).
13 RsTATEmmNT, AGmC" § 289, comment d (1933).
N4 McComicx, EviDENcE § 225 (1954).
35 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 1745, 1747 (3d ed. 1940).
16Id. § 1750.
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sary restriction, an additional limitation requiring the declaration to illuminate
or explain the act or event has been added by most courts. 17 Wigmore describes
this additional limitation as one of the several spurious offshoots from the
"verbal act" doctrine.' 8 There is no fundamental reason for the application of
this spurious restriction to the general limitation (c) since it has little relevance
to trustworthiness.' 9
By adopting the spontaneous declaration doctrine as justification for the
admissibility of an alleged agent's statements to prove the agency, the Murphy
case is illustrative of a liberal interpretation of Wigmore's limitation (c) to
prove the agency. Nevertheless, the holding has but scant support in other
American jurisdictions. The Supreme Court of South Carolina would tend to
favor such logic, as evidenced by the decision in the Chantry case. In this per-
sonal injury action a statement was made by a chauffeur immediately after the
accident. He stated he was working for the defendant company, and to tele-
phone them and they would get him out of trouble. This was held admissible
on the basis of the spontaneous declaration exception without reference to whether
the agency had been proved by other evidence. Justice Cothran's dissent was
based on the failure of the declaration to explain, describe or elucidate the
character of the act.2 0
The Chantry decision was followed by the same court in Lowie v. Dixie
Stores2' where the question was whether the driver was the defendant's agent.
Though theere was no independent evidence of an agency relationship, the court
held admissible as a part of the res gestae the driver's statement immediately
after the accident that he worked at the defendant's store and was out delivering
groceries.
Another decision gives full support to the South Carolina view, at least in
so far as proving the scope of employment by means of the hearsay exception.
In Mancuso v. Hurwitz-Mintz Furniture Co.22 the court held admissible as a
spontaneous declaration a statement of a truck driver immediately upon the
happening of the accident that he was going to the garage. The main issue was
whether the driver, who had previously departed from his employer's work on a
personal mission, had returned to the defendant's employ at the time of the
accident. The court stated the driver's declaration was not a statement that he
was acting as an agent. Rather, it was a statement of fact showing just what
the driver was doing from which the court could draw the legal conclusion of
agency.
One line of cases admits that where the activity is generally within the scope
of authority as shown by independent evidence, the out-of-court utterances of an
agent may be admitted under the spontaneous declaration exception.23 Another
17 Id. § 1750, 1754.
18 Id. § 1752. The "verbal act" doctrine of evidence is based upon the assumption that
where some act or conduct has no legal significance, or at most an ambiguous one, the state-
ments accompanying the act are admissible in evidence for the purpose of removing the
ambiguity and giving definite legal effect to the act or conduct. See generally WiomoRE,
EvmENcE § 1766-92 (3d ed. 1940) for full discussion of this doctrine.
19 McCo1aucic, EVIDENCE § 272, n. 15 (1954).
20 156 S.C. at 16, 152 S.E. at 758.
21172 S.C. 468, 174 S.E. 394 (1934).
22 183 So. 461 (La. App. 1938).
23 Gardner v. Marshall, 56 Cal. App.2d 62, 132 P.2d 833 (1942) ; Smith v. Miller, 209 N.C.
170, 183 S.E. 370 (1936).
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line of cases indicates that where there is independent evidence of agency, the
out-of-court utterances of an agent are admissible under the exception to prove
scope of employment.2 4 But frequently such declarations are rejected by the
courts because they fail to throw light upon or explain the exciting event and
therefore do not qualify as spontaneous utterances. 25 The reasoning of the
judges in this latter line of cases accompanies the idea that the spontaneous
declaration exception can be a dangerous rule and should be strictly construed.
At least one case, while excluding evidence of an agent's statement because
it failed to throw light upon the accident, suggested that even if it had qualified
as a spontaneous utterance it would be to no avail because the rule prohibiting
admissibility of an agent's declarations concerning the existence or extent of
authority prevails over the spontaneous declaration exception. 26
The California tendency is to follow the majority of courts elsewhere in
regard to the application of the spontaneous declaration doctrine. This excep-
tion to the hearsay rule is incorporated generally into the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure to permit as admissible evidence the declarant's extrajudicial statements
where the declaration forms a part of the transaction. 27 Existing California de-
cisions tend to hold to the strict interpretation of the spontaneous declaration
exception in regard to the spurious limitation requiring the utterance to illumi-
nate or explain the exciting event.28 Wigmore's list of general limitations for
the spontaneous declaration exception, including the limitation requiring the
statement to relate to the circumstances of the occurrence preceding them, has
been quoted often as authority by the courts.?
Whether California has absolutely adopted the aforementioned spurious limi-
tation is at least questionable, however, in the light of one recent decision by
a district court of appeal. In Dillon v. Wallace" a store patron slipped on a
piece of parsley. The store manager's statement upon finding the patron in
pain at the scene of her fall that she should not worry about the injury and
that "we" had insurance and would pay her bills, was admissible against the
store owner as a spontaneous declaration. The court relied on the general limi-
tation that the statement must be relevant to the occurrence but used no language
characteristic of the spurious limitation that the statement must illuminate or
explain the event. The statement held admissible here did not illuminate or
explain the exciting event which led to the manager's spontaneous utterance,
2 4 American Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. McWilliams, 55 Ga. App. 658, 191 S.E. 191
(1937); Piedmont Operating Co. v. Cummings, 40 Ga. App. 397, 149 S.E. 814 (1929); Barz v.
Fleischmann Yeast Co., 308 Mo. 288, 271 S.W. 361 (1925); Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
Brown, 297 S.W. 267 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
25 Dudley v. Preston Motor Co., 51 F.2d 8 (6th cir. 1931) ; Jackson v. Goode, 49 A.2d
913 (D.C. Mun. App. 1946); Deeter v. Penn. Mach. Co., 311 Pa. 291, 166 Ad. 846 (1933);
Adams v. Quality Service Laundry and Dry Cleaners, 253 Wis. 334, 34 N.W.2d 148 (1948).
26Myers v. McMaken, 133 Neb. 524, 276 N.W. 167 (1937).
27 CAL. CODI CIV. PROC. § 1850: "Where, also, the declaration, act, or omission forms part
of a transaction, which is itself the fact in dispute, or evidence of that fact, such declaration,
act or omission is evidence, as part of the transaction."
28 People v. Mahoney, 201 Cal. 618, 258 Pac. 607 (1927) (criminal prosecution).
29 Showalter v. Western Pac. Ry. Co., 16 Cal.2d 460, 468, 106 P.2d 895, 900 (1940).
See Wilcox v. Berry, 184 P.2d 939, 940-41 (Cal. App. 1947). (Heard in the California Supreme
Court where the evidence was held admissible on another ground and the spontaneous dec-
laration question was not passed upon. 32 CaL.2d 189, 195 P.2d 414 (1948)).
3o 148 Cal. App.2d 447, 306 P.2d 1044 (1957).
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indicating a possible adoption of the liberal application of the spontaneous
declaration exception.
In view of the recognition by many courts today of the true distinction
between the vicarious admissions and the spontaneous declaration principles
as separate theoretical bases for the admissibility of an agent's extrajudicial
statements, it would seem appropriate for the courts to seek clarification of
the requirements and limitations of the two principles. The court in the Murphy
case clearly defines the true boundaries of the general limitations attached to
the spontaneous declaration exception on a rational basis.
Where the courts have been ready to discard other spurious limitations
borrowed from the "verbal act" doctrine, such as the requirement that the
words must be by the actor himself31 and the requirement that the words must
be precisely contemporaneous with the act,32 it seems reasonable that the limi-
tation making it necessary for the words to explain or illuminate the act should
also be rejected as an absolute restriction. The test for receiving the utterance
should be true spontaneity-the reason for admissibility resting squarely upon
its relevance as a trustworthy statement. "The purport of the statement and
its relation to the exciting event should be merely matters to be considered in
determining whether the declaration was spontaneous or was reflective.1 33
Though contrary to the existing law of evidence as propounded by most
courts, the Murphy case might well serve notice of a possible change.
Jack A. Butt
81MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 512 (1942).
32 Showalter v. Western Pac. Ry. Co., 16 Cal.2d 460, 465, 106 P.2d 895, 898 (1940).
83 McCoPa icx, EvIDEN CE § 272, n. 15 (1954).
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